Formed: April 2011
Disbanded: 2015
First Attack: September 14, 2012: Abu Iyadh al-Tunisi, the leader of AST, organized riots and looting targeting the U˳S˳ embassy and a nearby American school in Tunis, following an attack on the U˳S˳ Embassy in Benghazi (4 killed, 29 wounded)˳[1]
Last Attack: July 16, 2014: Militants used rifles and grenades to attack Tunisian soldiers at military checkpoints near the Tunisian border with Algeria (14 killed, unknown wounded)˳[2]
Executive Summary
Ansar al-Shariah in Tunisia (AST) was a Salafi-jihadist militant organization established in 2011 that combined community service, proselytization, and violence to promote its Salafi ideology and goals in Tunisia˳ The group aimed to establish Shariah law in Tunisia and promoted the idea of global jihad˳ The group targeted the Tunisian government and armed forces, utilizing a dawa, or charitable works, campaign to gain trust among Tunisian communities˳ Since its establishment, AST supported Al Qaeda; however in 2014, multiple AST leaders, including AST spokesman Seifeddine Rais, swore loyalty to IS˳ Many left the group to fight in Syria˳ It is unclear whether the group continues to operate secretly or its members have dispersed to join other jihad groups˳
Group Narrative
Ansar al-Shariah in Tunisia (AST) was a Salafi-jihadist militant organization established in 2011 that combined community service, proselytization, and violence to promote its Salafi ideology and goals in Tunisia˳ The group aimed to establish Shariah law in Tunisia and promoted the idea of global jihad˳ AST was not formally affiliated with the Ansar al-Shariah organizations operating in Libya, Yemen and Egypt˳ However, AST and Ansar al-Shariah in Libya (ASL) reportedly shared operational, financial, and logistical links˳[3]
Plans to create AST arose in 2006 in a Tunisian prison, when future leader Seifallah Ben Hussein conceptualized the organization with twenty other Islamist prisoners˳ After the Tunisian revolution in 2011, the prisoners were freed and began to build the group; AST officially became active in April 2011˳ AST had support from Shaikh Khattab Idriss, one of the most influential Salafi clerics in Tunisia and began meeting with the powerful political party al-Nahda˳ (The two later grew apart when al-Nahda gained power in the government and its connection to the increasingly violent militant group became a liability˳[4]) AST quickly established a public relations system, creating a Facebook page and the “al-Qayrawan Media Foundation,” which helped it grow to a reported 40,000-50,000 members by 2012˳[5]
AST’s flexible membership system bolstered the group’s recruitment˳ Individuals pursued AST’s mission in a variety of ways, from joining military operations to teaching religion classes in their communities˳ AST typically sent its fighters to operate outside Tunisia˳ For example, several thousand militants reportedly participated in training camps in Libya and joined the Syrian Civil War˳[6] However, AST members more frequently promoted its ideology through lectures, charity, publications, and online posts˳ According to AST leader Tunisi, the group was organized around the idea that “Tunisia is a land of dawa (charity in the name of Islam), not a land of jihad˳”[7]
While AST claimed responsibility for few attacks, the Tunisian government and the media implicated the group in multiple suicide bombings, small arms attacks, and kidnappings in Tunisia˳ Most infamously, the U˳S˳ government confirmed that Hussein orchestrated rioting and attacks on the U˳S˳ Embassy in Tunis on September 14, 2012, which killed 2 and wounded 29, following the riots at the U˳S˳ Embassy in Benghazi˳[8] The Tunisian government blamed AST for the assassination of two Tunisian politicians in 2013 and subsequently designated the group a foreign terrorist organization˳[9]
Following this designation, the Tunisian government cracked down on both the organization’s dawa activities and purported militant operations˳ Hussein went into hiding and AST shifted from highly publicized dawa events and social media publications to declarations of solidarity with other Salafis around the world and calls for cooperation among militant groups˳[10] In light of its designation as a foreign terrorist organization, AST also confirmed its loyalty to Al Qaeda (AQ)˳[11] In order to avoid the Tunisian military, in 2013, Hussein fled to Libya, where he began calling for reconciliation and cooperation between the Islamic State (IS) and other Islamist militant organizations throughout North Africa˳[12]
In 2014, AST began targeting the Tunisian government and military in its attacks and further developed its relationship with IS˳ Multiple AST leaders, including AST’s spokesman, Seifeddine Rais, swore loyalty to IS, and many left the group to fight in Syria˳ [13] Although AST has backed IS on social media in past years, the extent of its connection to the group is unknown˳[14]
In August 2014, AST also began to operate under the name Shabab al-Tawhid, reportedly to conceal its actions from the Tunisian government and media˳ However, the media continued to refer to the group as Ansar al-Shariah in Tunisia˳[15] The Tunisian government’s crackdown and the alleged death of AST leader Hussein in June 2015 forced AST to move its operations underground˳[16] The Tunisian government allegedly deployed 100,000 security forces to limit militant activity and defend tourist sites˳ Following deadly attacks in 2015 in Sousse and Bardo by Ajnad al-Khilafah, a militant group which emerged from AST, the government reportedly launched 700 security operations, arrested hundreds of suspected militants, and closed over 80 mosques suspected of supporting jihadism˳[17] It is unclear whether the group continues to operate secretly or its members have dispersed to join other jihad groups˳[18]
[1] Gall, Carlotta˳ “Tunisia Fears Attacks by Citizens Flocking to Jihad˳” The New York Times, 05 Aug˳ 2014˳ Web˳ 13 Aug˳ 2014; “Tunisia Blacklists Salafist Group˳” BBC News, 27 Apr˳ 2013˳ Web˳ 13 Aug˳ 2014˳
[2] “Ansar Al-Sharia in Tunisia (AST)˳” Counter Extremism Project, n˳d˳ Web˳ 19 Aug˳ 2016˳
[3] Irshaid, Faisal˳ “Profile: Libya’s Ansar al-Sharia˳” BBC News, 13 June 2014˳ Web˳ 15 Sept˳ 2014; Carlino, Ludovico˳ “Ansar Al-Shari’a: Transforming Libya into a Land of Jihad˳” The Jamestown Foundation, 9 Jan˳ 2014˳ Web˳ 10 Aug˳ 2016; “Al-Qaeda in Libya: A Profile˳” Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, Aug˳ 2012˳ Web˳ 10 Aug˳ 2016; “Ansar Al-Sharia in Libya (ASL)˳” Counter Extremism Project, 2015˳ Web˳ 10 Aug˳ 2016; “Libya suicide blasts leave 40 soldiers dead˳” Al Jazeera, 3 Oct˳ 2014˳ Web˳ 14 Oct˳ 2014˳
[4] Zellin, Aaron˳ “Tunisia: Uncovering Ansar Al-Sharia˳” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 13 Oct˳ 2013˳ Web˳ 14 Aug˳ 2014˳
[5] Gall, Carlotta˳ “Tunisia Fears Attacks by Citizens Flocking to Jihad˳” The New York Times, 05 Aug˳ 2014˳ Web˳ 13 Aug˳ 2014; Zellin, Aaron˳ “Tunisia: Uncovering Ansar Al-Sharia˳” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 13 Oct˳ 2013˳ Web˳ 14 Aug˳ 2014˳
[6] Gall, Carlotta˳ “Tunisia Fears Attacks by Citizens Flocking to Jihad˳” The New York Times, 05 Aug˳ 2014˳ Web˳ 13 Aug˳ 2014˳
[7] Zellin, Aaron˳ “Meeting Tunisia’s Ansar Al-Shariah˳” Foreign Policy, 8 Mar˳ 2013˳ Web˳ 13 Aug˳ 2014˳
[8] Gall, Carlotta˳ “Tunisia Fears Attacks by Citizens Flocking to Jihad˳” The New York Times, 05 Aug˳ 2014˳ Web˳ 13 Aug˳ 2014; “Tunisia Blacklists Salafist Group˳” BBC News, 27 Apr˳ 2013˳ Web˳ 13 Aug˳ 2014˳
[9] “Tunisia Blacklists Salafist Group˳” BBC News˳ 27 Aug˳ 2013˳ Web˳ 13 Aug˳ 2014˳
[10] Joscelyn, Thomas˳ “Ansar al Sharia Tunisia leader says gains in Iraq should be cause for jihadist reconciliation˳” Long War Journal, 14 June 2014˳ Web˳ 15 Oct˳ 2014; Zellin, Aaron˳ “Shabab Al-Tawhid: The Rebranding of Ansar Al-Sharia in Tunisia?” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 09 May 2014˳ Web˳ 14 Aug˳ 2014˳
[11] Joscelyn, Thomas˳ “Ansar Al Sharia Responds to Tunisian Government˳” The Long War Journal, 3 Sept˳ 2013˳ Web˳ 15 Aug˳ 2014˳
[12] Joscelyn, Thomas˳ “Ansar al Sharia Tunisia leader says gains in Iraq should be cause for jihadist reconciliation˳” Long War Journal, 14 June 2014˳ Web˳ 15 Oct˳ 2014; Zellin, Aaron˳ “Shabab al-Tawhid: The Rebranding of Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia?” The Washington Institute, 9 May 2014˳ Web˳ 15 Oct˳ 2014˳
[13] Roggio, Bill˳ “Ansar Al Sharia Tunisia Deputy Leader Reportedly in Syria˳” The Long War Journal, 27 Feb˳ 2014˳ Web˳ 14 Aug˳ 2014˳
[14] Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed, et al˳ “Raising the Stakes: Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia’s Shift to Jihad˳” International Centre for Counter-Terrorism-The Hague, Feb˳ 2014˳ Web˳ 23 July 2018; “Ansar Al-Sharia in Tunisia (AST)˳” Counter Extremism Project, n˳d˳ Web˳ 19 Aug˳ 2016; Zellin, Aaron˳ “Shabab Al-Tawhid: The Rebranding of Ansar Al-Sharia in Tunisia?” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 9 May 2014˳ Web˳ 14 Aug˳ 2014˳
[15] Zellin, Aaron˳ “Shabab al-Tawhid: The Rebranding of Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia?” The Washington Institute, 9 May 2014˳ Web˳ 15 Oct˳ 2014˳
[16] Petre, Christine˳ “Tunisian Salafism: the rise and fall of Ansar al-Sharia˳” FRIDE, Oct˳ 2015˳ Web˳ 23 July 2018˳
[17] Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed, and Bridget Moreng˳ “Tunisian Jihadism after the Sousse Massacre˳” International Centre for Counter-Terrorism-The Hague, Oct˳ 2015˳ Web˳ 24 July 2018˳
[18] Spencer, Richard˳ “Senior Tunisian Jihadist and Osama Bin Laden Associate ‘killed by US Strike in Libya'” The Telegraph, 3 July 2015˳ Web˳ 23 Aug˳ 2016; Petre, Christine˳ “Tunisian Salafism: the rise and fall of Ansar al-Sharia˳” FRIDE, Oct˳ 2015˳ Web˳ 23 July 2018˳
